

1/9/84

He's going to put this on me while I have a chance to study the reading list here. (PAUSE) Is this for sound or just for recording? Both. It's interesting.

I was sitting here watching this being passed out and remembering a course I attended once at Harvard Summer School that made an enormous impression of an opening statement. It was a French scholar, very...gee I've forgotten his name...very sexy looking guy actually. Harvard Summer School was filled with teachers, mainly women teachers from all over the country. And he had a marvelous description of his course which was on Kleist I remember, and ~~Helderlean~~ <sup>Helderean</sup>, this extremely romantic description, very long and so the place was packed like this. I was sitting in there and he came in, sat down, looked very continental and he was absolutely silent. Didn't look disorganized like me. Just sat there for quite a while, like this. (PAUSE) It was a total silence in the room. Finally he leaned forward and said in rather a high voice, French accent, to a woman in the front row. "May I see the catalog please?" And she handed it to him and he studied this marvelous course description and said, and then he launched into a very brilliant and apparently extemporaneous lecture which...I was very impressed by that so I was tempted to ask someone.

The subject of this course, the title is actually taken from a book by Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. I find, after I finished this final reading list, or next to final reading list, last

night, that I had not put Kissinger's...any of his works on this reading list. Oddly enough, and there is more from Herman Kahn. I'll talk about the reading list later. We're going to have a break, I'll talk for about an hour and then we'll take a break. And in the second hour among other things I want to talk about the reading list. Last night ???? I switched some of it from REQUIRED to RECOMMENDED to cut down the total load although Julie Margolis just informed me that I'd switched just the wrong things so we'll have to talk about that. Including Herman Kahn. One of Herman's, his second book, with the title, Thinking About the Unthinkable, starts with the comment which I think is a quote from someone else, "Thermonuclear war is unthinkable, but it is not impossible and therefore we must think about it."

Well, let's start with some good news. Edward Teller, New York Times, January 3rd 1984. Last week. Palo Alto, California. It begins, "About 40 million Americans are likely to survive a worst case large-scale nuclear attack, even without any protective measures." There is another report we are going to be talking about later that ~~comes out~~, has come out in Science, this latest issue, and in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs which is on the Required Reading for today by Carl Sagan, which starts out that a nuclear war will kill, or the latest studies up until the study he is reporting, the National Academy of Sciences study indicated that a thermonuclear war would kill at least 1.1 billion people and wound another 1.1 billion or...adding to half the world's population. And it goes on to say, so much for the immediate casualties, but what this study concerns is what will the world be like for the

survivors. And that's mostly bad news. But I thought that Teller's opening here shows the different way of looking at these things. Its that glass half full or half empty phenomenon, you know, repeated. About 40 million Americans are likely to survive a worst case large-scale nuclear attack. Of course for many years, Teller, who until recently, has liked to be called the father of the H-bomb, has been bringing this news to us. That at least half the world's population would survive the experience of his baby—of an H-bomb, of a thermonuclear war—rather than focusing on the number that would die.

Let me give you another piece of good news. Actually since this didn't seem to cheer you up as much as I hoped it would. This is Richard Nixon's birthday. All right? Right. I didn't know that this morning in San Francisco, I got that from your local papers here, The Los Angeles Times. He's more remembered here in Orange County it seems. It's his seventy-first birthday and as a matter of fact it's appropriate that we should celebrate his birthday which, that...the fact that it's his birthday is not a secret, I believe. But it is appropriate that he should be remembered by this class on this day because in fact it's an earlier secret of Richard Nixon's which is the genesis of this course. At least it's a secret I'm about to reveal, I suspect, to you, although it has been available for some years now, but I have a feeling that most people, unless they've read something by me or heard me before, are not aware of it. An appropriate thing to celebrate on someone's birthday. That is how Richard Nixon almost won a war. And since we seem on the way to entering a very similar war, or a couple of them in this year, coming



up, this is a good time to find out what Richard Nixon's secret plan to win the Viet Nam war actually was.

But let me see if this is unnecessary for you. I'm going to spend a large part of a lecture later on on this subject so I'm not going to go into detail. But let's see if you know it already. I learned that secret and then followed up on it, some years ago, but years after the event, in a memoire put out by his Chief of Staff, H.R. Bob Haldeman, who revealed that Nixon, in fact, had had a secret plan to win the war. And that it was essentially the same plan that his former boss Dwight Eisenhower had used to win, or end, the Korean War. Now I want to ask, then, this group right now, and please don't be falsely modest or silent, Let me see hands on this. How many know what Haldeman was talking about in terms of Nixon's plan to win the war? How many do not? OK. Get the complement here. How about the reference to Eisenhower? I'll give you the exact way that Haldeman talks about it. Well, he says that Haldeman was going to do it...said that Nixon planned to do it the way that Eisenhower had ended the Korean War. How many people know what he is referring to there? Or think you know? Let's see how many...Take a look around, how many. And again, how many do not? Here's somebody who had his hand up both times. How did you know that? Oh, OK, Hersh. How many people have read Hersh's book by the way? That's very...that's true, you'll see that I have assigned in the recommended reading, some large passages in Hersh that do give you in some detail, that story. Let me ask two more questions to see where we are as we start on this course before I give the answers to the first two parts of the quiz.

TR?

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The theme of the course as described in the catalog is "What are U.S. nuclear weapons for?" How many would accept this as a reasonable statement of the purpose of nuclear weapons as seen by United States presidents and public? It's essentially a quote from a past (my former boss) Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara in another article that is on the required list in foreign affairs recently. Nuclear weapons have no other purpose, no other use, than to deter their use by an opponent. Essentially to threaten to retaliate to, and thus to deter, or if necessary to retaliate to, the use of nuclear weapons on the United States by an enemy. How many here would recognize that as your understanding of what nuclear weapons are for, or have been for? That's about half as I see it. How many would disagree with that? Interesting. About half, or less, not everybody answered. That's a changed proportion that I've found in the last couple of years. If I asked that question as I have even three or four years ago I think nearly everybody would have been in the first category.

Those of your who answered differently may have been educated by Reagan's responses to the second question, last question, fourth question. Does the United States have a tacit or formal either tacit or formal policy that it will NOT initiate the use of nuclear weapons? An effective no first use policy. How many would say that in your understanding we do have such a policy in practice? Hum. All right. One last time, how many would not? Now, I'll just pick one at random here. What, why would you think not? May I ask you?

A: Yes. I've heard that a people say that Reagan made a statement that we would not make the first strike, that .... unintelligible

You heard Reagan say that we would not do a first strike. Let me be a little more precise. We're going to talk about the terms "first strike" that this woman just used, and I'm going to distinguish that from "first use," and I'll get to the definitions in a moment, but I'm speaking now quite generally. Not necessarily about hitting Moscow, but about initiating the use of nuclear weapons, perhaps tactical nuclear weapons under any circumstances. In case there was a confusion about that, is it your understanding that Reagan is or is not prepared under some circumstances as a matter of policy to initiate the use of some nuclear weapons if necessary?

A: It is my understanding...

That he would.

A: Yeah.

Even though, as I understood you before, you felt that he would not, that he has said he would not.

A: ?

You think he might have his fingers crossed on that one, is that right?

A: That's                               and I'm not sure that I heard him say that  
but I ??

Any other answers on why you think we do not have a no-first-use policy?

A: Am I correct in thinking that ??

OK. Could you hear that by the way? Can you hear these answers? Yes, you are correct. It has been our policy with respect to NATO as a formal executive commitment to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a large scale conventional attack, or to define it differently, an attack that NATO conventional or nonnuclear forces could not stop. It has been assumed militarily and politically from the beginning of NATO that that means almost any major attack by the Soviet Union in the NATO area, at least one in which they persisted in the face of the risk that they would face nuclear weapons we are committed actually to carry out commitment to initiate the use at least of tactical nuclear weapons. And if those do not stop the Soviets we are committed to escalate that up to what I will later define as a "first strike," an all-out strategic attack on the Soviet Union on its homeland, on its ability to retaliate against the United States. So we have had both a "first use" policy in the sense of a threat to use short-range tactical battlefields nuclear weapons, so-called small, relatively smaller, tactical nuclear weapons, and also a



"first strike" policy where I use that to refer to the initiation of attacks by one superpower against the homeland of the other. And it's understood that such an attack on a large scale would in particular seek to disarm, or reduce the damage which the opponent or the victim could wage in return against the homeland of the attacker. Yes?

Q: ??

The political commitment, which is a signed treaty in NATO is that any member of NATO will treat an attack on any other member as an attack on itself. Very strong, very strong commitment. It is not a commitment to consult, nor to consider what we should do, it is to treat that attack as if it were an attack on ourselves, requiring, presumably, a military response. And when I say that our nuclear commitment goes beyond that, I'm speaking now of the military planning which is approved by the President and by the other heads of state of the NATO countries, and is reflected in presidential speeches and Secretary of Defense speeches to the NATO heads of state, often in classified speeches. I wrote one of the annual classified top-secret policy speeches for McNamara. But also in public statements. To summarize this, then, and I'll work through these questions backwards, then, the United States does NOT have a no-first-use policy. The United States has a first use policy in the sense of in some cases stated, explicit, binding commitments to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against an opponent who has not used nuclear weapons. But who has perhaps attacked in other ways. Although it is not

limited to that necessarily. For example, the United States does not rule out a so-called preemptive attack which is a use of nuclear weapons in the anticipation that we, or our allies are about to be attacked. And that doesn't necessarily mean about to be attacked with nuclear weapons. It could mean about to be attacked with non-nuclear weapons with perhaps the likelihood that that would escalate as the word is, expand to the use of nuclear weapons eventually. In other words, we don't rule out formally that we would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in advance of any fighting at all. Although, let me introduce a further distinction that we will be referring to. I'll distinguish that from preventive war, which would be an attack by non-nuclear or nuclear weapons well in advance of any expected hostilities. Not in the presence of hostilities, not in the expectation that hostilities are about to commence. It might take place, one could imagine that happening, because one expected that sooner or later at some less favorable time, hostilities might start and it was preferable to do it now. Nations have often undertaken war for that purpose.

Preventive war, nonnuclear or nuclear, is not a part of U.S. public policy, nor to my quite well-informed knowledge, a part of our secret policy. I have to make this proviso of "to my knowledge" we're talking now about matters which if they were matters of secret policy would of course be very secret and could be quite unknown. For example, to the President. If such plans existed. And that is not a joke, as we will see. But I can say that at quite high levels, secret policy statements have ruled out the notion of preventive war in that sense. But that is

all that is ruled out. Either in American planning or policy or in actual consideration. And when presidents have occasionally said, as this woman mentioned, and she has, I am sure heard statements and not only by Reagan about this, that the United States would not strike first, that is truthful only to the extent, the misleading extent, to which it refers to this concept of preventive war. It does not rule out a preemptive attack which as I said is undertaken in the special circumstances of the belief that you are about to be attacked, or an attack may actually be under way at that moment, but the warheads have not yet arrived, let us say, or the troops have not yet arrived. That is not ruled out. Nor is the initiation of nuclear weapons ruled out. And when I call that first-use, or when I call the initiation of strategic attacks first-strike, the word first there does not imply that I am talking about the initiation of hostilities. In fact in most cases it will not mean that. ~~I don't...~~ It not only doesn't necessarily mean that, I will not be talking about that for practical purposes in this course. Nearly everything we'll be talking about contemplates the possibility that the United States will choose to escalate an ongoing conflict, a non-nuclear conflict, <sup>by</sup> ~~but~~ being the first to use nuclear weapons, ~~and I don't~~ <sup>by the way</sup> first use is not only a U.S. possibility, it could be Soviet first use. It could be, it appears, Israeli first use, it could be English, and so forth. ~~But it means that in those various cases.~~

Likewise a first strike could constitute such even if a nuclear war were already going on. Imagine something that Reagan did talk about. A nuclear war which had been up to a certain point confined to Europe. A



possibility which almost...a statement by Reagan of a possibility, which statement came close to creating the antiwar, antinuclear movement in Europe on a large scale. As they heard a U.S. President assert the possibility in his eyes of a nuclear war that would be limited to Europe.

I'm saying that out of such a war an attack by the United States on the Soviet Union coming in advance of any Soviet attack on the U.S. would be, in my terms, a first strike, a first strategic strike. It's just a technical term, but think of it then as a first strike against the homeland. Are those distinctions clear, then? So far?

Q:

I'm sorry?

Q: ??

According to our commitment. Are you saying? It has been...what the Europeans were reacting to was, that it has been the...it was the understanding at the beginning of the NATO planning, going back to 1950 and the early 50s, that really the first escalation of nuclear weapons in those days was thought to be against the homeland of the Soviet Union. In fact, at the very beginning around 1950 there were no so-called tactical nuclear weapons that is short range weapons whose use would be confined to the European, East Europe or West Europe. Our only weapons were quite large weapons carried by long range planes at that time mostly

based in Europe but which were aimed at the Soviet Union. So the understanding of the U.S. nuclear commitment was a first strike, first use you might say. I'm going over these things in a way I hope to make the distinctions clear in your mind. First use in those days then would have been first strike. There was no real distinction. Later, tactical nuclear weapons were introduced in fairly large numbers by about 1954, 55. And at that point the use of tactical nuclear weapons was thought to be not a substitute for the use of the Strategic Air Command bombers but rather an accompaniment to it. The tactical nuclear weapons in cannons, in atomic demolition munitions, buried nuclear mines in the ground and various other forms, were thought to be for the purpose of holding and destroying Soviet armies in East Europe while SAC demolished their lines of supply and specifically demolished their homeland. Keep them out of Europe. I'll go a little more into that strategy, but they were not then thought of as something you use before you use SAC but as something you use along with SAC.

By the late 50s the Soviets had acquired large numbers of tactical and intermediate range missiles. The missiles of the range of the SS-20 that we have heard so much about in the last few years came in in 1959 and 1960, in fact in larger numbers of missiles than we now have SS-20s with the same range and with much larger warheads. It got up to about 700 of what are called intermediate range ballistic missiles, range roughly 1,000, 1,500 miles. Early in the course here for the benefit for at least some of you I'll try to spell out as many of these terms as I can. If I miss, please raise your hands and let me know. So that's in

contrast to the intercontinental ballistic missile whose range tends to be 5 or 6 thousand miles or more. Submarine missiles started at about 1,000 miles and are now getting up to intercontinental range but of course they come...so they are intermediate range missiles but they are based, of course at sea, and are close enough to the Soviet Union to target it.

There were, as I say, some seven hundred intermediate range missiles in the Soviet Union by the early 1960s. Herbert York, who was the first director of Livermore Labs, Teller's boss at Livermore as a young man, and then first director of research and engineering in the Defense Department and in charge of the Ballistic Missile Program. I'll be referring to him a number of times. Wrote an article with a chart in it showing the number of one megaton warheads necessary to destroy all life in the open in each country in Europe. And it was a simplified calculation, based on sort of the optimum number of warheads and assuming, just for simplicity, that people did not take cover, and so forth, but how many warheads it would take to kill everyone by fallout alone, ignoring blast and fire and other effects, so ignoring the effects of hitting cities, just looking at the fallout that would be created by groundburst weapons of one megaton size. Now that was a warhead yield not picked out of the air because that was the yield of the SS-5 and no, what were the numbers? SS-5, yes, SS-4 and SS-5, the intermediate range missiles had one megaton warheads. One megaton warheads mean that they have the equivalent in explosive yield of one million tons of TNT. That's a measurement not of their fallout but of their explosive power. And one million tons of TNT is



half the tonnage that was dropped in all of WW II. So each of these warheads have the equivalent of a half WW II on it.

The figure for Germany was 160 such warheads to kill all life in the open. For some countries, Luxembourg, it was a handful. For Britain, not very many. For Norway which doesn't have a large population, but is long and skinny and mountainous, it took more—a fairly large number. Germany was one of the higher ones. 160. They had 700. Mostly targeted on Germany. So, NATO plans finally changed a little bit in the late 60s under strong pressure from Mac Namarra in hopes of avoiding if necessary the early use of nuclear weapons by building up non nuclear defenses by which to meet a Soviet advance into Germany and then to limit as much as possible the use of nuclear weapons, if nuclear weapons were still necessary. Mac Namarra you may be aware has recently come out for a no first use policy, that is a commitment by the United States that we would not under any circumstances initiate the use of nuclear weapons. But as, and he has announced, that this was his private belief which he shared with the President, John F. Kennedy, at the time that he was Secretary of Defense. A belief that the United States should not, and so far as they were in control and concern, would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. But he did not announce that to the Europeans or to the Soviets at the time or to the U.S. military, for reasons we will go into later. He announced quite the contrary in speeches, indeed, which I wrote in some cases under his guidelines, we emphasized that if necessary of course we would carry out our NATO commitments to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. And to make that threat credible to the Soviets, and

more explicitly to our allies, that we would indeed initiate the use of nuclear weapons if our non nuclear defenses were failing. It was Mac Namarra who presided over the movement to Europe of the major part of the seven thousand warheads which were there by the late 60s. Most of these warheads were what Goldwater in 1964 in his campaign called "small conventional nuclear weapons." They were Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons which were indeed much much smaller than the megaton warheads of the SS-4s and 5s. They averaged, then, about 20 kilotons. That's 20 thousand tons of TNT equivalent, or the tonnage, the explosive yield of the weapon that killed 200,000 people in Hiroshima and likewise in Nagasaki.

Is there a way of getting water, by the way? Will somebody volunteer?

So the weapons went over there. In fact, you'll see in his foreign affairs article that Mac Namarra, later in the course, that Mac Namarra says that the placement of those weapons is, in fact, quite dangerous—they could be overrun by the Soviets very early. That would put, in turn, great pressure on our commanders to use them before they lost them. Or perhaps to save themselves from tactical defeat by annihilating advancing tanks or advancing enemy by the use of those weapons, even if they were not authorized...possibly. Especially in conditions where they were out of communication and so forth. That created a situation of instability, where things could get out of control. The weapons might be used even though the leaders of NATO

including the President might not want them used at that point. Why might they not want them used? Well, the use of them would, as Mac Namarra says, almost surely quote "escalate" to the use of the intermediate range weapons which have now been modernized to the SS-20 to the use of our own weapons and to the annihilation of all life in Europe as a first step toward intercontinental attacks.

There might seem a paradox in the real pressure by our governmental allies in NATO to be sure that we are ready to and would initiate the use of nuclear war. Since the mid sixties—since actually the late 50s, the alliance has been a suicide pact for Europe and East Europe, the Warsaw Pact and West Europe if commitments were carried out. It is a commitment to commit what will come to what Herman Kahn called mutual homicide. Very large scale. But (thank you) the fact remains, to finish the answer now, to the question, which was asked earlier. The fact remains that NATO policy did change in 1967 to allow the possibility that the first response to a Soviet overwhelming attack that was breaking through western defences would not include strategic attacks on the Soviet Union, but would involve tactical nuclear weapons and/or intermediate range nuclear weapons such as our forward based airplanes in that area or missiles of the sort we are now putting over there.

(Change tape side)

The reason that Reagan's reference to that possibility, then, hit Europe so strongly was that most Europeans simply had not heard that



change. What they ought to think of it, once they heard it, is another matter we'll get into it. But the fact is that Reagan's mention of the possibility that the war might be limited to Europe if the Soviets backed off under those circumstances—after we'd used nuclear weapons. That came to the Europeans as a surprise and an implication that we were changing the rules, changing our commitment in a way that seemed to them extremely unpleasant. It sounded as though it would be less deterrent of the Soviet Union since it might not involve attacks on the Soviet Union, less able then to prevent or deter Soviet advance into Europe. And at the same time might make the U.S. President more willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in hopes that it would remain limited to Europe. So on both counts it seemed to make their destruction not greater, but more likely. And that logic had a fair amount of merit. But it was not something that Reagan had introduced.

In most of the cases where we will be talking about Reagan's policies we are talking about policies that in fact he did not initiate, but in which he has played the extremely useful role of exposing or leaking to the public. Indeed, I say useful, in from my perspective. I think that if Reagan does not, in fact, destroy the world, he may well proved to have saved it because his reckless candor on our actual policies, which ✓ he is simply maintaining and continuing, has been indispensable in creating and mobilizing a world public reaction which is certainly indispensable to changing these policies. So if we live through them we may well look back and thank God that Richard, that Reagan (laughter) Richard...get back to Richard, spilled the beans. Yes?

Q:??

The French strategy?

Q: ??

Defense strategy...what are you referring to there?

Q:??

Well...Can I put? I don't quite understand. Let's talk about that afterwards, hon. I don't quite understand your question. Let me get it straight.

Let me carry on with the relation of this to the questions I began with. As I said we do not have a no first use policy. We have a first use policy. Second, let me say, U.S. nuclear weapons are not primarily for the purpose of deterring nuclear attack on the United States, and never have been. And when I say primarily I'm speaking of the purposes that motivate and rationalize the acquisition in any given year of new weapons. And I'm saying the bulk of new weapons in any given year from the beginning, have always been motivated by motives other than the deterrence of an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union. If I remember the answer on that the class was about evenly divided. Now see, that, too is a fairly big change. I would say even a few years ago nearly everyone would have believed that Mac Namarra was simply stating

U.S. policy in practice as well as in form, in describing the only purpose of nuclear weapons as being to deter nuclear attack on the United States. If Mac Namarra had said, "That is what the purpose should be seen as, other purposes should be as true. The implementation of other purposes should be avoided and recogn..." that would be something else and I would agree with that. You cannot understand, in my opinion, U.S. policy with respect to the arms race or the relation of nuclear weapons to our foreign policy, if you believe that most presidents, or in fact any presidents, have seen the value and purposes of nuclear weapons as Mac Namarra described them in the quote that I gave. If you are to suppose that presidents have believed that nuclear weapons were for no other purpose than to deter nuclear attack, you would not be able usefully, I believe, to understand why they have bought as many weapons as they have, or the kinds of weapons that they have, and why they are still buying them, and...or what it is that they actually see in those weapons. And that applies to the two presidents which Mac Namarra served, and to all the others. What I mean by that will emerge somewhat tonight and certainly will be the theme of this course. But by saying that, some of you might recognize that I am challenging the prevailing interpretation of the arms race by most of its critics, both in let us say the freeze movement, or in the establishment arms control circles, the SALT II proponents, and so forth. The prevailing understanding has been that of course nuclear weapons were just to deter nuclear attack from that point of view of the critics they clearly are excessive in terms of the needs—the requirements—for deterring nuclear attack. And



what is to be explained, then, is a phenomenon of waste, of excess. To be explained by inertia, by service rivalries, by the profits of the firms that make these weapons, by peculiar ideologies that have no basis in evidence or reality. And that essentially are determined below the level of the President.

The process is seen as one out of control of the President in the sense that the President has very little coherent purpose for buying these weapons, it is as if some time ago the President subscribed to a "missile-of-the-month" club. And...from the laboratories, for example. And his secretary pays the bills and these weapons just keep coming from the laboratories with bonuses like the MX or Pershing or something occasionally, and they pile up on the shelf unused and unusable. And I would say that... And how do we then deal with that? How do we shut off that flow? That understanding, I believe, leads in directions that are unfruitful, certainly the efforts of the arms controllers, as of the arms abolitionists have been unfruitful. And I think the lack of success in affecting policy has in part reflected an inadequate understanding of what the arms race is about in the eyes of the Presidents and others. I'm saying that I believe there is, in fact, more coherent purpose which in turn is more strongly based upon experience and evidence and reasoned argument than these arms controllers assume, or know, even if they were at quite high levels of the government as some of them were. Like Herb York, or ??????Yakowski, or Pete Scovill and others. In almost no case did these high level critics know war plans, know the proposed use of these weapons which happens to be the field that I did find myself in in

well  
yes!

the late fifties and early sixties. My expertise in the design of nuclear weapons, Those characteristics is zero except what I've picked up as necessary for my job, but in terms of how Presidents and joint chiefs of staff proposed to use the weapons, I do have a kind of knowledge which not many people do have and which I plan to share with you in this course. That's the major purpose of it.

Even so, and I speak now as somebody who wrote the war plan essentially in 1961, who drafted the first Kennedy Administration general nuclear war plan. Which in fact served officially for more than ten years as the war plan I now learn from some of these references, and still influences war planning. And in this context I bring that up to say I nevertheless had a lot to learn about what those weapons were for, and learned some of it only recently. Because, even to me, if I can say that—and I had a dozen clearances higher than top secret in the early sixties—these things were secrets from me, and from other people. And specifically, the answer to Haldeman's...the question I asked about Haldeman's point, was a secret. And it was learning that that led to the framework and the subject matter of this course. So let me turn to that.

I read in Haldeman's book, and this is now, I'm reading from a footnote to uh—you don't have to take it down but it's a footnote to my paper "Call To Mutiny" which is in some ways an overview of the course, and I'll be following it in this lecture tonight. That's why I assigned it in the first lecture.

In Haldeman's memoirs which came out in 1978, pretty late in the game, he said this. "When Nixon spoke of his desire to be a peacemaker

he was not just delivering words his listeners wanted to hear." It occurs to me, by the way, that when I speak of a secret plan to win the war a lot of you didn't hear that, exactly. How many actually remember 1968 and the campaign of '68 and the implications by Nixon that he had a secret plan to win the war. Fair number. But a lot of you obviously...I'm sorry?

Q: ??

A good question. To win the war or end the war. He actually...he used both words, and I'm going to get in a later lecture exactly what he had in mind. Either, one can imagine his using either word as a matter of fact. He did not plan to win it in the extremely ambitious sense that my former boss Johnson had hoped to win it at a certain point. From that point of view he had scaled down his ambitions. But he did plan to achieve an outcome that Johnson by 1967 or 8 would have, would have exceeded Johnson's wildest dreams and would have perceived as a win. Not any longer to destroy the Communist Party of Viet Nam, South or North and have a totally peaceful countryside under the sway of our Saigon regime, the so-called GVN or Government of Viet Nam, but rather to achieve a situation in which the government of Viet Nam, the Saigon regime, would be able to hold at least the major cities, Saigon and the major province capitals and district capitals of Viet Nam indefinitely with very low U.S. costs and U.S. casualties, even though large parts of the countryside might not be under their control. But they would have



brought the war down to a level then when they could handle with their own Arvin South Vietnamese forces, supported by U.S. money and...I'll mention, this is as Hersh brings out very clearly a secret part of the plan...the potential of U.S. air support indefinitely, but eventually, he hoped, without U.S. ground support.

He came very close to achieving that goal. But as I say that's for a later lecture. I want just to mention now what his plan for achieving it actually was, and that's another secret. He was absolutely convinced he would end it his first year. I remember during the campaign walking along a beach he once said, "I'm the one man in this country who can do it, Bob." He saw parallel in the action President Eisenhower had taken to end another war. When Eisenhower arrived in the White House the Korean War was stalemated. Eisenhower ended the impasse in a hurry. Now we're getting to my other question, "How did Eisenhower end it?" He secretly got word to the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea (one could add China) unless a truce was signed immediately. In a few weeks the Chinese called for a truce and the Korean War ended. Let me ask again. How many people are familiar with that account of the ending of the Korean War in 1953? And how many are not? Well, let me tell you, it's worth looking around when you raise the hands because I want you to have a sense of whether you are alone in not knowing something at a given moment or whether on the other hand, if you do know it whether it's something that everyone knows or not. That account is a pretty good paraphrase of Eisenhower's own public account some seven years after the event when he published his memoirs 24 years ago in

1960. You can see a pretty good section of Eisenhower's account of that again in the footnotes to "Call to Mutiny" and I won't go into it because it's pretty well paraphrased by Haldeman there. That is how Eisenhower believed he had ended the war, or asserted that he had ended the war. His chief of staff, his Haldeman, Sherman Adams, at the time once asked Eisenhower after the event what had led the Chinese to accept the peace terms and to keep them. And (I'm having trouble finding it, well, quote from memory) Eisenhower answered him, "Only their knowledge that we would use nuclear weapons."

Now I want you to reflect on the fact that most of you didn't know that. Didn't know what? Didn't know that Eisenhower said that. And by all accounts of people at the time who were around him Adams, Nixon, Twining, others—believed it. That's worth knowing. One reason you perhaps don't know it is, I have the impression that most historians that read that at the time passed it off as improbable or implausible. They could see other reasons the war had ended. Stalin had just died. The international situation had changed enormously. One could think of other motives for the Chinese to end it. Eisenhower was not in fact asking very much of the Chinese—although more than they had granted up to that time at Panmunjom. And they did not take seriously the notion that nuclear weapons could have been seriously threatened at that time or would have been effective. They seem to have passed over very quickly, the implications of the apparent fact that our President had made the threat and believed that it had been effective.

One can well assume that if you think that you have ended a war that way, you will use such threats in the future. And Eisenhower did. One

person who did was his Vice-President, Richard Nixon. Haldeman goes on "In the fifties, Eisenhower's military background had convinced the Communists that he was sincere in his threat. Nixon didn't have that background, the problem of making the threat credible. But he believed his hardline anticommunist rhetoric of 20 years would serve to convince the North Vietnamese equally as well that he really meant to do what he said. He expected to utilize the same principle of the threat of excessive force. He would combine that threat with more generous offers of financial aid to the North Vietnamese than they had ever received before and with this (which he did offer, but did not carry out) and with this combination of a strong warning plus unprecedented generosity, he was certain he could force the North Vietnamese at long last into legitimate peace negotiations. Into accepting his terms. They were negotiating at that point. But accepting his terms: which were in fact that the North Vietnamese should remove all of their regular North Vietnamese forces from the south. Something they never did do and did not accept to do under this threat. The threat was the key. And Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I am sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon haters everywhere.

We were walking along a foggy beach after a long day of speech writing. He said, "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry. And he has his hand on the nuclear button. And Ho Chi Minh



himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.'" He goes on to say as it turned out it didn't work out. But the threat was given, in fact, as Hersh finally brings out in considerable detail. But as I learned, by asking people from the White House staff, after I read that in Haldeman's memoirs.

I had written the first options paper for Kissinger and Nixon in December of '68, January of '69. The first paper considered by the National Security Council on any subject. And then later...immediately after that...a study called "National Security Memorandum 1." The first study memorandum with a series of questions to the various services to answer on prospects in Viet Nam. I had retained my contacts through, in '69, and later, with the White House staff. And when I read that in Haldeman there was something in it which rang true, suddenly, although it was a complete surprise to me. Which I'll come to later. And I took that seriously. I was one of the few who did, possibly. I may also have been the only person who read Haldeman's memoirs. Unless he read them. Which...so, likewise Nixon's memoirs. So I looked into it. And that led a bit further. It was clear that I had not learned of this. There were types of secrecy which went beyond what even I'd experienced. I would have assumed that I would have heard something of that from the people who had worked on those plans, who had turned against the war, and whom I'd known, later, both in the government and later in the antiwar movement. And it led me to raise the question, "If I didn't know that, if I didn't know that, having worked on strategic war planning, what else don't I know about this history?" And I began to look at what the public

record had to show. Of course one of the first things I ran into then was the public memoirs of Eisenhower, as I say, confirmed, and now confirmed by declassified documents that have come out showing the secret policy discussions of that period and war planning of that period.

By that time then it was not surprising that what had worked for Eisenhower in 1953 was not the last time that Eisenhower used that tactic. It was not the only memory that Vice President Richard Nixon had to go on when he finally entered the White House. Korea was in 1953 when those threats were made. 1954 the United States through Radfo...Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs, Radford and through Secretary of the State, John Foster Dulles offered the French three or more tactical nuclear weapons for use against China and the immediate environs of their troops—the French troops—surrounded at Dien Bien Phoo in Northern, North Viet Nam to save them. The French in that case turned down the offer. They felt that the Chinese Communists were, or rather the North Vietnamese Communists, were too close to their own troops at that point, they would have endangered their own troops if they had used our offered weapons. We were ready to make that experiment, but the French chose not to and they turned down our offer of one or more weapons to use against Communist China which was supplying the Vietnamese, on the grounds that that would have "incalculable consequences" meaning, for France. In 1954, in fact, the Soviets had almost no capability to reach the United States with strategic delivery power but as I've mentioned, they were acquiring the capability to reach France or other countries. Indeed a year earlier Eisenhower had mentioned that his one concern about having

to carry out the threat in Korea was that the Russians, behind the North Koreans, might retaliate against Japan again. And he said he was fairly anguished about this possibility, not so much as to tell the Japanese that this prospect was in store, or to modify his threat, but he saw it as a genuine possibility. So Bidot's worry a year later of retaliation against the French, would not have appeared absurd to our own President.

In 1955 threats were of nuclear weapons against China in connection with the the dispute over the Techun Islands in the offshore islands off Communist China. And the Chinese backed off. In 1958 the Chinese Communists began to shell the Island of Quemoy a few miles off mainland China on which Chiang had placed a third of his combat troops; apparently in preparation for an invasion of the island or a total blockade of the island which would lead to its downfall, and possibly then to the downfall of the Taiwan regime. As you will see in the study, assigned study by Morton Halperin, on this occasion President Eisenhower ended by authorizing the Joint Chiefs to assume—to plan on—the use of nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland immediately if there was an impending invasion or an ongoing invasion of the offshore island and, if necessary, to break a blockade of the island if that blockade were successful. To break it by attacking the artillery positions on the Chinese mainland.

This is the clearest cut case of a definite clearcut commitment by a President to use nuclear weapons if an opponent did what it was expected to do at that point in an impending ongoing crisis situation. In effect the trigger on armed nuclear weapons in the Pacific at least, was passed



to the Chinese. And they passed in effect. They backed off, and reduced their blockade by artillery to every other day. In fact allowing then the ships a face saving way of retreating so that the blockade was broken. In effect was not necessary to use nuclear weapons.

In 1960 Eisenhower's last advice to the incoming President Kennedy in early 1961 was that it might well be necessary for him to send troops to a conflict in Laos. And Kennedy did face that prospect with the Joint Chiefs he had inherited from Eisenhower and the war plans that he inherited from Eisenhower and these Chiefs pointed out to him, as can be seen in memoirs of Sorenson (which I think I'll add to the recommended reading) that if those troops were...if we sent U.S. troops as they recommended, into Laos, which is a landlocked country, it was possible that they could be cut off. Airfields could be overrun, they could be surrounded with no possibility of resupply. In that case it would be necessary to use nuclear weapons to protect them. This was in general true if either the North Vietnamese entered the conflict in Laos or the Chinese entered the conflict. We would need to use nuclear weapons against either of those enemies since our troops would easily be overwhelmed. Kennedy...they wanted a commitment in advance to Kennedy that those weapons would be used and in fact delegated to the commanders in the field. He did not give such a delegation. He did not turn...but he did not turn off the planning. He did go into negotiations which led to an outcome that was adequate for him. So again that was not tested. But he did not reject the advice of the Joint Chiefs that he should put the troops in but that he should do that in their opinion only with a

commitment, or an understanding at least, that he would use nuclear weapons if necessary.

You'll find in my "Call to Mutiny" that I didn't include that particular episode in the list I gave of instances in which U.S. Presidents have seriously considered the possible imminent use—first use—of U.S. nuclear weapons. We did not send the troops. Kennedy did not make a clearcut commitment. I didn't put it in that list. The list does comprise instances in the administration of every President from Harry Truman to Reagan, with the exception of Ford, who was in shorter than any of the others. And what that list does include, then, are the instances some of which I've just mentioned to you in which in ongoing crises the President did seriously consider the possible immediate use if necessary of nuclear weapons and in many of which cases he actually threatened them. Made that known either by newspaper leaks or direct communications to the opponents.

To finish the list quickly, in 1961 there was what I called in my list a public crisis—the Berlin Crisis—which invoked, of course, NATO planning that we've been discussing which was well known to the Europeans at least, to involve the commitment of first use of nuclear weapons if necessary. In '62 the Cuban Missile Crisis in which President Kennedy judged, we learned later, the possibility of war—general war, nuclear war—being somewhere between one third and one half. In 1964 (and again I think I'll add this reference to the recommended reading—I want to put in there so you can look it up a good part of the publicly available literature, at least for your reference) you'll find in the Pentagon

Papers discussion as early as '64 of the possible later use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam, though that wouldn't come into this list because it was a contingency kind of discussion. But in 1968 an incident that does make the list where Marines were surrounded at Kason in Northern...South Viet Nam and where there were newspaper leaks of Presidential consideration of the possible necessity to use nuclear weapons and those leaks were in fact correct. Kason did not...was not in fact attacked, unlike Dien Bien Phoo. I find it easy to believe that those published threats had a good deal to do with that and that this does in fact again represent a victory for Lyndon Johnson of the sort that...a tactical victory...of the sort that Eisenhower had had in 1953, or thought he had.

In 1969 as I've just mentioned, President Nixon did in fact make threats of the possible use of nuclear weapons in the fall of 1969. And we'll go into that in some detail later. Again, he made those threats apparently in '71 and '72. And in '73 a crisis which has recently been studied in some detail by Barry Bleckman (which is on your reading list) in the Middle East War of 1973 the American nuclear alert widely believed at the time to be an aspect of American domestic politics---distracting attention from the socalled Saturday Night Massacre which had just occurred, turns out to have been as Kissinger asserted very passionately at the time, an act of international diplomacy, a genuine threat of possible nuclear war.

Finally, in the Carter doctrine in 1980 after the invasion by the Russians of Afghanistan was explained by White House officials and defense officials at the time as being a threat to initiate nuclear war



if necessary. And that that was the concrete meaning of Carter's more careful public statement that we would use any means necessary. It didn't take much to read nuclear weapons into that statement if you imagined that Carter were sincere in that because we're talking, of course, about a part of the world which was in 1980, and is today, and was for a long time before that, a long ways from home----from the United States, and on the border of the Soviet Union.

Defense Department studies which have always indicated, and which were leaked to the public for the first time in 1980, that the Defense Department regarded it as necessary to use nuclear weapons if there was a major move into Iran, did not reflect the well publicized advantage of the Soviet draft and the Soviet army over the United States forces which are smaller and have no draft. This Carter doctrine commitment was actually made in a speech in which Carter asked for draft registration. There was a lot of discussion on the draft at that time. But the need to use nuclear weapons had little to do with the fact that you are not presently being drafted. If we drafted women, children, and old people, the fact remains that the Soviets would outnumber us twenty-to-one in that area on their borders. We are no more able to deal unilaterally with the Soviets on their borders such as Turkey or Iran, than the Soviets with their larger army would be able to keep us from the gas or oil of Mexico or China with non nuclear means alone. The possible necessity of using nuclear weapons in that area follows only from our perceived right and need to protect "U.S. interests" or U.S.-backed regimes in that area thousands of miles from our home bases and on the borders of the Soviet

Union. And I can say that the plans we heard about in 1980 were simply the same that I had seen exercised in war games at Rand and elsewhere in the late fifties.

These plans were reasserted by Reagan in his...in '81 then in his first days in office where he almost repeated the words of Harold Brown to the outgoing Secretary of Defense a month earlier who had said in his last press conference, "What keeps the Soviets out of Iran militarily is the fear of World War III." Reagan used almost the same words a month later in an interview.

World War III started by whom? We are talking about nuclear war now, not just the start of conflict. Who would be the first to use nuclear weapons in Iran. The Soviet Union? With, as the studies indicated, its twenty-to-one superiority in that area? Not really. That's not why we were sending our carriers armed with nuclear weapons to the Indian Ocean and to the Persian Gulf and searching for bases in that area. It was a threat slightly veiled of U.S. first use of nuclear weapons by Carter and Reagan. And veiled or not, that is the reality of our war planning.

To go back a bit. In 196...I...well, now let me rather characterize this whole pattern. I repeat. Every President from Truman to Reagan, with the possible exception of Ford, has found himself in a situation where he has used nuclear weapons. Used them in the sense that you use a gun when you point it at somebody's head in a confrontation, or you prepare to do that and you load it for that purpose. Whether or not you pull the trigger. If you get your way, if the other person backs off without your pulling the trigger, that is the best possible use of the

gun. That's basically what you bought it for. And that's what Presidents use their nuclear guns for and it's why they buy them.

They learn what we on the whole do not learn so clearly. That their predecessors have found a need to use that threat, have had occasion to do so, and that it has often worked in their terms. It has done...the threat has done what they wanted. It has worked. They have a difficult job, it's a hard world, as they keep telling us. And none of those Presidents, who have differed a good deal in their attitudes towards force and U.S. policies in the world, none of them has found himself willing to divest himself of that instrument of policy. I'm not suggesting that any President has wanted a nuclear war—any of them—from Truman to Reagan. And to be quite specific, I do not believe that Reagan wants a small or large nuclear war, any more than any of the others. But all of them have wanted to threaten nuclear war if necessary. All of them have felt the need to back up our interventionary forces with the threat of initiating nuclear war at some level if necessary and the threat to escalate that war if the Soviets should respond to it as they have the physical capability of doing.

This brings in a second major point I want to make about the relation of nuclear weapons to our foreign policy. I've implied that at least the tactical nuclear weapons have in fact served effectively in most cases to support and back up our expeditionary forces. Our marines, our airborne, or our allies forces in administration after administration, but if that were all that were involved, there would hardly seem to be a necessity for most of the weapons we have and especially the larger ones. That



refers to the fact of the characteristics of the opponents that I've just described.

To show how little this pattern is appreciated, let me mention a quote by Herman Kahn here in his book on thermonuclear war which was written in 1959, published in 1960. Quote on page 240, "There is one wartime control measure that already exists: a ban on the use of atomic weapons in minor conflicts." Herman's discussion of the need for a first use policy as well as a threat policy refers almost entirely to NATO and I think a couple of the people who commented here did reveal a very common understanding of those who understand that we have a first use policy. They believe that it refers to NATO and nowhere else. Evidently that is false from the examples I've just given. Herman went on to say in '59 "Official statements to the contrary," and then he underlines this, it's in italics rather, "it would be almost unthinkable" (we'll take a break here in a minute) "it would be almost unthinkable for the United States or the Soviet Union to use atomic weapons against a small country that did not possess atomic weapons." Now you'll notice that in almost every case the threats, with the exception of Cuba and Berlin, the threats were made against countries that did not have nuclear weapons, as was our first use of nuclear weapons—against Japan. Clearly that's safer to do and has not been found to be unthinkable, illegitimate, or unnecessary. When he says it is unthinkable, almost unthinkable, you know Herman, for Herman to say something is unthinkable is quite impressive. But he might be glad to know he was wrong, even there. He says, "it would be almost unthinkable to use this against a small country

/ *threat*

that did not possess atomic weapons. Only a few government officials do not realize this," he says. Well they included every President, unfortunately, and so these small countries did not fail to experience those threats. Would they have been carried out?

When one looks at the planning, one looks at the presidential statements and knows the statements about them, it is very hard to believe what most people did believe at the time. They were bluffing.

✓ But then the presidents knew something that most of us in the public did not know at that time—another thing. They had a near monopoly of nuclear weapons even against the Soviet Union during most of that period. As the fifties wore on there was no longer, of course, a physical monopoly of nuclear weapons, but the Soviet delivery capability was almost exclusively against Europe or Japan and surrounding countries.

They had in 1961 exactly 194 intercontinental bombers that could reach the United States on two-way missions with refueling. The U.S. had 3,000 bombers in range of Russia. The Soviet Union, rather the U.S. had 200 warheads within range of the Soviet Union at that time. Over 100 intermediate range missiles of our own at that time like the Pershings we're putting in now into Europe, and about 48 Polaris warheads at sea, about 40 Atlas and Titan warheads in this country, about 200. The Soviets at that time of course, could reach the United States with missiles only of intercontinental range—ICBMs. They had 4 at that time. That was, by the way, and is, top secret, as far as the government is concerned.

I'm declassifying that for you without authorization in the belief that it is not too early for you to know, 24 years later, now, 23 years

later, what the reality was behind the alleged missile gap on which Kennedy campaigned a year earlier in 1960. The assertions of Democratic leaders and leaked from the Air Force and CIA at that time, were that the Soviets would have some hundreds of missiles in 1960 or '61, leading up to many thousands by the mid-sixties. When I was at SAC headquarters in 19...in August of 1961, just at the height of the Berlin Crisis, the same month as the Berlin Wall was installed, and before the new estimate appeared, the...I was told by the Chief of War Plans that the Commander of SAC, Thomas Power, assessed the ?????? officially at that time that the Soviets had 1,000 missiles. They had 4. He was wrong by 250 times, not 250 percent, 250 times wrong. Considerable error. But the CIA estimate had been several hundred, earlier, at that point. The most recent estimate was lower than that, it was something like 120 to 160, long only by 40 or so times.

Let me go back to the threat that I...the use that was made of our nuclear weapons in 1961. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy have both asserted quite vociferously, in recent times, in connection with their own assertion that we should eschew nuclear weapons, first use, that Kennedy would never have used nuclear weapons first. How many of you have heard that? In fact. Are you familiar with that? You're not familiar with that assertion. I can say in fact that when I first said some of the things I'm just saying now I was in the presence of McGeorge Bundy who had been, I should explain, the National...the Assistant for National Security, the Henry Kissinger position of the Kennedy Administration. And he had been really quite friendly in the course of



this talk that I was giving until I made the assertion that I said that every President had made such threats. And (Julius will be interested in this anecdote, perhaps) this was in a colloquium in honor of Bernard Body that was taking place down in Los Angeles and he went red in the face at that point. He's a man who never...doesn't lose his cool very easily. And he actually pounded the table and he said, "I worked for two of those Presidents and I can assert flatly that that was untrue for the Presidents that I worked for. They never considered such a thing." And I was quite taken aback by this. What I actually was thinking of at that moment was the Laos situation, but of course, Berlin, Cuba, could have been mentioned. And I spent some time talking to Bundy later and thinking about what could lead him to believe that what he had just said was true, which he obviously very sincerely did. Now he has revealed, of course, part of that. The secret...I should say McNamara has revealed the secret that Kennedy had agreed with McNamara in conversation that it was his intent never in fact to launch nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. But of course that's not what I was saying. And not even what I was interested in. The issue was, had he used them in the sense that I have described? Had he relied on threat? Well, we'll go into those studies, but it should be fairly selfevident what that answer is, although it was obviously not evident to McGeorge Bundy who has a reason of his own not to want to perceive that I would say. But let me remind you, just before the break, one last question. A lot of you were not alive I guess at that time. Some of you were, though, pretty young. Let me see how many in this audience recall that President Kennedy in July of

1961 made a (you won't be called out). By the way you're not going to be held too accountable for dates and minutia in this course in terms of the reading, let me tell you that right now. There's going to be a lot of names and a lot of dates

(change from Tape 1 side 2 to Tape 2 side 1)

...have fallout shelters by private enterprise, by the end of the year. You should provide yourself with fallout shelters because of possible thermonuclear war over Berlin." This in connection with his calling up of reserves, putting SAC on alert, sending additional troops to Europe and asserting out determination to use any means necessary to protect Berlin. How many people here remember that policy? Raise your hands. I...well, its a young, it really is a fairly young audience, but let me, wait, let me see the hands a little more...can I? Some of you weren't too old. How old were you then?

A: ??

In '61? How old were you in '61?

A: ?? (laughter)

Yeah, but not to be invidious, I couldn't answer that question if...ah...

A: 13

13. Good. Anybody younger than that? What...how old were you?

A:

What do you recall of that?

A: I recall....

That's good memory. Life had a special issue on the need for civil defense at that point. What do you remember?

A: Drills in school where you know, you sit under the desk.

Yeah. By the way, Teller at the time was proposing the same measures that he is proposing this week, that would save more than 40 million people in a thermonuclear war. Sitting under the desk and so forth. How...(laughter) Now that you've...How many others do remember that episode? OK, see it does stick in memories if that occurs. You may remember for example, the ethical dispute at that time of whether it was within just war doctrine, and Christian ethics in general to equip yourself with a machine gun to keep your neighbors out of your fallout shelter if they had been so improvident as not to buy their own. How many remember that? Alright, more people. The answer was "yes" on the



whole. Ethics have to keep up with the times to some extent. Now, not too many actually do remember in this college audience, and of course each year it's a few less. Even a few years ago, I would say, a very large part of any given audience would remember that, and one did remember it, even at 5 and 10. Of those who remember that, some of you are my age. How many were clear at the time that if nuclear war had occurred as a result of Berlin it would not have been started as nuclear war by the Soviets, it would have been U.S. initiated nuclear war. How many understood that in 1961? I know you're my age, Julius. Do you remember that? What did you think? You did assume that? Well, you didn't raise your hand. Don't sit on your hands here. Unusual. Unusual, though. The fact is that typically in an audience, let's say of older people who do remember that, no one will acknowledge having understood the possibility that what Kennedy was talking about was a nuclear war in which nuclear operations were initiated by our country. A U.S. first strike. I can tell you as somebody who wrote the war plan in that year Kennedy was not worried that the Soviets would initiate nuclear operations with their 4 ICBMs. But that is not unrelated to the fact that you have not picked up in your reading or your history courses or whatever, that little fact. Why it's still secret. You may guess why I think it necessary to make it unsecret at this point.

Not only does the fact that the actual balance at that point reveal just how false the public understanding of the balance had been—the understanding which had led us to ratify as a public the largest defense buildup until now (under Kennedy). But it also reveals the nature of our

foreign policy at that point with respect to NATO and Berlin in a dimension that no President until perhaps Reagan has seen fit to expose to the U.S. public. Its reliance, year after year in all parts of the world, starting in Europe, but elsewhere as well, upon a willingness, and a readiness, a plan, a Presidential determination, to initiate nuclear war if actions that are regarded as possible, perhaps even likely by our intelligence services, actions of our opponents should take place which would trigger our commitments, or our plans. It was not only Eisenhower in 1958 in Quemoy then that passed a trigger to U.S. nuclear weapons to an opponent. There is no question, I would say, whatever commitments Kennedy may have made to himself as McNamara has reported that the trigger was in...to our nuclear weapons was in the hands of the Soviet Union in 1961. And they backed off. The threat worked, for reasons again that should be apparent to us.

And it's rather important to know the difference—the real difference—between that era and this. The threats are still being made. But the man who had backed down because he didn't have the nuclear weapons with which to confront us—our threats—in Quemoy and in Laos and in Cuba and in Berlin—Khrushchev—was fired, in part for that reason and was replaced by a man who was backed by the military because of his commitment to them they would never again have to back down for that reason. And we're making the same threats in which the Soviets now do not have 4 missiles. They have 1,400 land-based missiles. And in which those warheads again thanks to our refusal to consider a ban on the Merving, the multiple warheads missile. Those missiles don't have one

warhead each, they have thousands of warheads facing us. The threats are still being made and the risk is no longer just to West Europe. We'll get to that in the second part of this lecture. Let's take a break and we'll think about this. Make it about 10 minutes? Fifteen minutes. We'll convene at about nine o'clock.

BREAK

Of course people are welcome to audit the course as long as there are seats available. The purpose of the quizzes is to satisfy a long-held dream of mine that I've never had the chance—I do a lot of lecturing but ordinarily, this is really the first course that I've given that's been paid by the university. I was paid by the students at Stanford once for one other course, and my first chance then to speak to people on a number of times and really lay out different aspects of the problem. I made the mistake at Stanford some years ago (on advice) of making it no credit which meant that people thought it would be immoral to do the reading, given their other requirements. And I am looking forward, actually, to facing an audience as we go along later on that has actually done some of this reading. You are not alone in not being aware from the answers you've given of many of the historical facts that I'm raising or the analytical points. That's the state of the American public in general and I believe a very significant factor in where we are in the world today which is on the brink of an abyss. I believe that public ignorance fostered by the American government through its secrecy system and



through the willingness to lie about these problems has been indispensable to the acquisition of 30,000 nuclear weapons which is what the U.S. has today, roughly. And a process in which the Soviets now have 20,000 nuclear weapons. I think that really could not have come about had the American people known more. At least that is a somewhat untested belief of mine and it's the reason I'm giving this course and have been doing what I've been doing for the last some years: trying to bring this information out. So I am anxious for you to do the reading. I've pared down the required reading pretty drastically from the earliest indication that you got and that may be a little costly in some cases because as Julius Margolis pointed out to me some of the more abstract reading—it's not very abstract, it's not very abstract, but rather abstract—is what I have switched from the required to the recommended. Namely stuff like Schelling, my own lectures that I gave 20 years ago on the art of coercion and Herman Kahn's work which I put over to the recommended in preference to more, somewhat more factual or policy-oriented papers that I thought would need your reading. Now the latter which are on the required, pretty do...pretty well do parallel what I'll be saying in the lectures. Later on I do plan to put out supplemental bibliographies just for your reference material—those of you who want to go further—including a lot of material that presents very different points of view that I happen to think are wrong. I'll certainly...I'm happy to discuss those in class but did not focus on them in the limited amount of reading that are required. Most of which, as I say, corresponds to the sort of thing I'm saying and I think reveals a lot of useful factual material. Julius

mentioned, though, that it may be precisely the somewhat more analytical or abstract work that you need to read in addition to hearing it in the lecture. Therefore when you see in the recommended readings stuff like Kahn or Schelling or my own unpublished writings, some of the others. Turn to those to help you understand the lectures if you have problems with some of the material that comes later on. And don't feel that just because it's not required you shouldn't give any time to it.

The quizzes by the way then will be for the purpose of allowing you to feel that you have a right or a need to do that reading, despite the fact that you have other courses to prepare for. The quizzes will frankly be pretty easy to pass finally if you've read the reading. They are just really to find out if you've read the reading. We're not going to strive for much more understanding in a class this size. But I do feel confident that if you do the reading you'll benefit by it and I'll be satisfied.

I had meant, actually...may I...we've been a little late getting started in the first place and so forth, can I go till ten o'clock as opposed to 9:50. No? Yes? No? How many say "No we can't go to ten o'clock?"

Q:

Larry, could you hear that? (Larry answers)

Yeah. But really within days I think you'll have virtually all the recommended reading. Incidentally, the availability... This is one last

comment on the course and on the reading. There has been an explosion (hard to avoid that word) of information in the last year thanks to the freeze movement and thanks to Reagan's revival of interest in this subject and thanks to a number of other things. The Freedom of Information Act which had some relation to the Pentagon Papers Trial, I'm glad to say, which made available information on war planning which was extremely closely held in the fifties and even most of the sixties. But now thanks to Freedom of Information Act a great deal of information has become available on early war planning and really right up until the...I think the latest work goes to 1960 or the plan just before the one that I put out and there's quite a bit on that thanks to interviews.

And moreover, thanks to interviews and leaks and backgrounders and what not a great deal of information is available about current war plans of a sort that was un...absolutely unavailable even with high clearances within the government to anybody ten or twenty years ago. And that's reflected in books that are on your...that I was forced to put on recommended because I just felt there was too much reading, such as Greg Herkin's book, The Winning Weapon, a study of the early war plans. And the work, you'll see largely on the recommended list now of Desmond Ball and Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon. Robert Scheer has shown how much it's possible to bring out in his book With Enough Shovels, also on the recommended list, largely by interviews and some leaks on the very latest planning. So we really are...the knowledge of what is going on is quite different today from what was possible 20 years ago. And we're taking advantage of that in this course. I'm taking advantage. I should



say, indeed, that for the reasons I've given, a lot of that information is as new to me as it will be to you when you read it. It was extremely illuminating to me to read only in particular the work of David Rosenberg. And it was his labors in getting a lot of his declassified which lies behind the Herkin book to a large extent.

It was very illuminating to me to discover that plans that I had worked on and read in the late fifties related as closely as they did to the plans of the late...the early postwar period which I had not seen myself in the government. And again from the work of Ball and Scheer and Kaplan and others I discovered how closely related those plans are—the ones I worked on in the sixties—to the ones today. Indeed, I would not have expected that my own knowledge of the planning which was probably as great or greater I really should say, greater than any other civilian had in the early sixties, young as I was. I would not have expected that it would remain relevant as the strategic situation changed in the late sixties as much as it did. And the seventies. And I find, in fact, regrettably, for the most part, that my knowledge of that period does remain extremely relevant. Or more relevant than it was in some of the intervening period. And that's a phenomenon worthy of some discussion or analysis later. I won't go into it now. But basically it's because the basic purposes which nuclear weapons have served in the world have been fairly constant throughout that period. Even though most people, including myself as a war planner, most people were unaware of those purposes most of that time and thus mysterious aspects of that process characterize most peoples' appreciation of the problem. Puzzles, paradoxes, mysteries.

And the fact that geography has been very similar. As I say Iran is still on the borders of the Soviet Union. The oil of the Middle East is as interesting to the United States planners and Presidents as it was then. And the felt necessity for potential U.S. intervention in that region, and the necessity to back up such possible intervention with the possible use of nuclear weapons is, simply, a constant for this entire period.

Someone asked me if we had made threats of nuclear weapons in the Caribbean or in Central America or Latin America. Yes and no, I'll come to some of the details, but on the whole, not very seriously and for reasons that should be plain enough from what I've just said now. Hard for U.S. troops to get surrounded in Central America. Hard for U.S. high explosive bombing from carriers or bases to seem inadequate for any given degree of desired annihilation in Central America or even Latin America and that's to call on us to use nuclear weapons. And for those same...that's why we do make the threats elsewhere and why we're in fact not too likely to make them directly in Central America.

That does not mean, however, that the crisis to which we are heading, or which we are involved in, the war which we are in in Central America right now is free of risk of exploding to nuclear war. Again we perceive the Soviets and claim the Soviets as our opponent in that area. And, again, Secretary Haig made public his belief which simply went underground when he left, that the way to deal with our problems in Central America is to blockade Cuba. And that means to renew the Cuban missile crisis. The blockade of an island largely dependent upon supply

by the Soviet Union and East Europe in an era when the Soviets no longer have 4 missiles as they had in 1961. Someone asked me in the break how many they had in the Cuban Missile Crisis the next year. The answer is 10, operational, although by that time they had more building. Again, we were facing 10 missiles. That's not what we are facing in a Cuban Missile Crisis this year or next year. So the possibility then of a nuclear war escalating from a conflict arising out of Nicaragua, El Salvador and the Caribbean is immediate, and not just hypothetical.

Herman Kahn contributed a very simple framework for analyzing such uses of nuclear weapons and strategic objectives which has had very little influence in, on the whole, strategic analysis since and yet which remains quite fundamental. It's why I assigned his reading and why that reading is initially and now it's recommended. And it's why his analysis with all its vulgarities in many ways which led to its being written off a good deal of the time. Is I believe—has always been—more relevant to our actual planning and our actual purposes than that of most of his more polished academic rivals such as Henry Kissinger or, for that matter Albert Wolfstetter and a number of others.

Most of these have concentrated on what Herman calls Type I deterrents, which he defines as the deterrents of nuclear attack on the United States by the threat of nuclear retaliation. If you remember the question I asked earlier...he would define as...I asked whether you thought that this was the only kind of deterrence...this was the only purpose I should say, that U.S. uses nuclear weapons in. And Herman emphasized that there were in fact several kinds of deterrents of which



this was only one. Type I he called it. Type II deterrence was the deterrence of extreme provocation, an extreme challenge of some sort, such as an invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union, by the threat of initiating nuclear war against the homeland of the Soviet Union. In his various writings he has various categorizations of other types of deterrence—not totally consistent. Type III and Type IV and so forth, referring to the use of, for example, tactical nuclear weapons, or limited non nuclear war as a deterrent. But in nuclear terms, let us say, the use of a few nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Not an all out attack to deter lesser challenges, let's say, or as a lesser response to a major challenge. But let me put that aside for the moment and stick to the two types of deterrents. With Type II, then, I repeat, being the attempt to deter major challenges to U.S. interests or the attacks on our allies by the threat and readiness to initiate a first strike, to initiate allout war against the Soviet Union.

I think it follows from what I've been saying (and from what you've been answering a bit earlier) the public as a whole has not understood to this day—at least prior to Reagan—that the United States had an objective of Type II deterrents; although a subgroup under the public, a large number, did understand that we did protect Europe by that means. As I'm saying, even Herman did not take seriously at all, as he said, public statements to the contrary, he did not, he said, he did not take seriously that his Type II deterrents, an allout attack against the Soviet Union, could apply to things much less than an attack in West Europe or say the Middle East.

Dulles indeed, as you'll see from one of the assigned readings, Jim Sheppley's interview with Dulles in 1956, Dulles did in fact assert that his massive retaliation policy not only was a real threat policy, but had been effective—had been utilized and had been effective in a number of cases. And indeed he...when he wrote that he had...the cases he used were real cases, we now know. The article I remember at the time was simply not believed at the time. In part because of this general misbelief fostered by the government that the United States was facing an enemy that was either more powerful than we were in nuclear terms or about to be so. And that was especially true in the late fifties, but even in the mid fifties there was a so-called "bomber gap" which preceded the missile gap. The belief that they would have a greater capability than we ourselves had to use what was called central war on the homeland of the superpower. So it was hard to believe that what Dulles was saying could be serious, a serious policy of the United States, or if such threats were made, hard to believe that they were anything but bluffs.

They were not bluffs. And indeed there is a good deal to understand and explore in that of a psychological nature I think. But there was the reality behind that which the administrations were not willing to share with the public that the balance was quite different from what the public was being told. To give one reason for that (to get the public to buy the armors and later the missiles which were the substance of this enormous disparity of power, which were the basis for this extreme asymmetry which amounted to a near monopoly of strategic delivery power) it had been found quite early—in fact in the Truman Administration—that

it was most expedient to mobilize the public for those expenditures and the risks involved in the buildup by holding out to them the fear of an imminent Soviet attack on the U.S. as the reason for this readiness to commit thermonuclear war. It was not thought to be expedient or practical politically to reveal to them the perspective of the actual Administrations, Democratic and Republican which was these weapons were justified not because there was any need for them to thwart or avert a Soviet nuclear attack, but in order to—or to defend the United States, continental United States, but rather to defend our global—widespread global interests—of a variety of natures, political, economic, diplomatic, with the threat of initiating nuclear war against people who did not have them. Even though those people might be allied against the Soviet Union which increasingly did have them.

The problem I'm alluding to here which called for the major buildup was of keeping the Soviets from supporting their non nuclear allies in the face of our nuclear threats against those allies. What was to be deterred by these weapons, then, and by Type II deterrents, for a very long period—the threat of allout attack—not as it later came to be the threat initially of tactical nuclear weapons, but a real willingness to go against the Soviet Union, was not a Soviet attack on the United States which in the earliest days was not physically possible, but rather to deter what was possible. Soviet non nuclear support to our opponents whether they were regimes that we were opposing or insurgents of some sort against whom we were intervening with troops far from our own shores. It was and is believed that to a very exaggerated degree but



with some reality, that we would not need to consider major interventions if it were not for the support given to our opponents or insurgents by the Soviet Union or the East Bloc. It is true that our major interventions have, as in Viet Nam, had to be major in part because of materiel support that came through China or the Soviet Union. But I'm saying at any rate that we've believed that these people couldn't be standing up to us even at much lower levels if they didn't have that support and that's a standard imperial piece of arrogance, basically—from which the Russians are not immune, nor is any other imperial power. It's clear that the Russians did not expect the degree of resistance they are getting and still getting in Afghanistan, they were not able to learn from our experience in Viet Nam any more than we could learn from the experience of the French in Viet Nam, or than Republicans could learn from the experience of the Democrats. Those guys didn't know how to do it. We will go in there and do it right. We will do it with the necessary brutality and efficiency. Each Administration came to believe that. And when they failed, could only turn to the wily and vicious superpower opponent as the explanation for their failure. And thus the Russians today undoubtedly feel that it is the rather marginal support given to the Afghanistan freedom fighters or resisters that is accounting for their trouble. And that is an unwise belief, actually on their part and will help keep them there for a long time.

The desire though, then, to keep the Soviets from that kind of support is the threat that if they make it necessary for us to do so we will hit those rebels or whoever we are fighting, with nuclear weapons.

That we can do at long distances use this extreme, concentrated explosive power without a long logistic train. In fact we can do it from the United States, if necessary, or from carriers. But what if the Soviets give their opponents, I'm sorry, their allies, our opponents, nuclear support, as they could? What if they give them nuclear weapons, or themselves reply? Since the fifties, and even more in the sixties, the Soviets have had the physical capability to do that. And I'll go into this more later, but the...if the...our own intervention is to be credible, our threats of nuclear intervention must be credible. And if those are to credible against an opponent that could be supported by the Soviet Union there is the problem of deterring the Soviets from retaliating to our first use of nuclear weapons. I'd like to repeat that formula.

The basic problem has been to deter the Soviets from retaliating with nuclear weapons to our first use of nuclear weapons against their opponents. That is not a formula you'll find much in writing—even in the writings here much, but it is implicit in the basic framework that I'm suggesting to you tonight. If they are not deterred the problem then is to escalate and to deter them from replying to our escalation. We'll go higher, we'll overbid. That's what Pershings are for Cruise Missiles, theater nuclear weapons, and ultimately if the Soviets should reply to those, if they could, they must face the risk that we will escalate to allout war, to a first strike.

This is all...can be seen then in this rubric of Type II deterrents which is described in some bases as "extended deterrents." But the Type

II formulation is a bit better in some respects because it suggests a different category, not a mere extension. As Herman pointed out quite in some detail and despite his crudities which reflect his verbal delivery (I'll explain to you parenthetically, Herman who is an enormously fat man and had the jolliness which is supposed to go with this public presentation, so was in fact one of the funniest people, perhaps the funniest person, I've ever seen. He was just a standup comedian. And it doesn't come through in print. It really sounds awful in print without his delivery and without some of the jibes and many people were simply led to ignore what he was saying...plenty of reasons to oppose what he was saying, but were simply put off by the surface peculiarities of what seems a very flip delivery. Taking the subject lightly.) But in fact he spells out in a good deal of detail that the requirements for making credible the threat to initiate nuclear war or escalate or launch a first strike are different from the requirements of retaliating to an opponent's first strike. He goes in as I say in quite detail to the kinds of weapons, and more than weapons—the kinds of civil defense, the kinds of antiballistic missiles, the various posture aspects, not just the warheads—that are related to threatening credibly or carrying out the initiation of nuclear war as opposed to surviving and retaliating to nuclear attack.

The theme of Herman's book was that we were neglecting these required aspects. And you'll see the whole burden of all of his writings is this is what we should be doing. We need a credible first strike capability. And people were recoiling from that just as they recoil when they hear



Reagan say much the same thing. If you listen to Reagan or his advisors like Pearl and...or the various people quoted in Scheer's book. They in fact sound exactly like Herman Kahn. And the emotional reaction to...the political reaction is much the same as Herman evoked. This is outrageous. This is horrible. This is unthinkable. Wild. Who are these guys who can imagine that we need this, that we have a right to have it, that it's safe and so forth.

What makes his writing so relevant today is that, unknown to Herman, Type II deterrence was what the U.S. was consciously pursuing, not Type I. The apparent deficiencies of our posture in that time, from his perspective—the lacks, the things that we weren't doing—reflected the fact that the requirements of Type II deterrents were in fact a good deal weaker, were easier to fill in 1950 and 60 than they are today. Easier than he knew. Herman believed that the Soviets then had hundreds of missiles, or were about to have hundreds of missiles, as they do today. So he was calling for kinds of weapons and kinds of capability—some of which we have today and some of which we are in the process of buying still, twenty years later. He didn't understand that to carry out credible threats or to carry out a first strike then you didn't need all that against an opponent who had four missiles. He didn't know. I'll go into that...that has a...I'm saying this perspective goes a lot toward explaining what our policy actually has been but I'm summing that up by saying, unknown to Herman (and I'm telling you that to understand the reading) unknown to Herman, what he was describing as U.S. policy objectives and strategic objectives were accepted by every President

we've had—more or less reluctantly. Some quite reluctantly, others less so—but accepted...and acted on. And the changes in our posture and planning have reflected nothing so much as changing, evolving requirements for meeting this constant strategic objective.

What Herman

CHANGE TAPE SIDE

strike capability. Each President has regarded that as a necessity just as Herman urged. Reagan is not the first. What Reagan is asking for is the weapons to make that credible in a world where the Soviets now have hundreds...over a thousand, hardened missiles as well as submarine missiles and so forth. And indeed I would guess that a major reason why the Reagan Administration with its willingness to be so open about these threats was supported by establishment figures for office was that we come to a point where the expenditures to support that policy were very large, required very new weapons, required (we'll get into this later) but required the MX and the Pershing and the Cruise, and precisely weapons of these capabilities to make these threats credible against the Soviets. And they were now available. And indeed in support of that theory we real...we...you...one discovers that every element of the Reagan program, every weapon with the exception of the B-1. But every functional element was in Carter's program, and Carter came in with a different party, entirely different background, entirely different way of expressing himself, but an entirely different attitude toward nuclear

weapons. The programs that Reagan is pursuing are Carter programs in every respect. And the groundwork was laid, the programs were laid for them, and that alone should reveal to us we are not confronting an idiosyncrasy of personality, or politics, or party at this point. We are looking at something very deeply rooted in American policy making machinery and strategic aims.

In effect I'm saying that the world we are living in has become remarkably close to the world that people at Rand and the Defense Department such as myself and Kahn and Wohlstetter and Schelling believed was the case, or was about to be the case, in the late fifties. A world of a heavily armed Soviet Union in nuclear terms. A world in which it was difficult to make threats credible against them, but not quite impossible if you thought it important enough as Herman did (I didn't), if you thought it necessary you could pursue certain measures, and the very measures that Herman was pursuing was proposing at that time which sounded quite outlandish, our being implemented right now. Which is why...is one aspect of what I was saying earlier, that I discover that the strategic discussions of today are uncannily familiar to me from discussions of twenty-five years ago.

I'm saying that in contrast to the world of the late sixties when it seemed impossible to get at Soviet retaliatory forces, because they were in hardened silos and our missiles were not accurate enough to destroy them so that the goal of disarming them or even claiming that we had an ability to disarm them seemed unattainable. In contrast to that period, where the insights, the arguments, the discussions of the late fifties no



longer seemed relevant, the Soviet missiles became, in effect, vulnerable again in the mid seventies because since the...thanks to the active lobbying of Edward Teller in particular, Livermore Labs, Los Alamos Labs, the two campuses which along with you are campuses of the University of California, thanks to their effective lobbying in Washington there was no test ban on either warheads or missiles. As a result of that we acquired the accuracy and the warhead yield and the numbers of warheads through Merv to make the hardened Soviet missiles again vulnerable as the soft, above ground missiles had been in the early sixties or the bombers had been in the early sixties. In other words retaliatory forces became vulnerable—subject to attack—and one could again aspire to make credible the threat that if they drove us to it, we would attack them and disarm them to lower our damage.

Of course, thanks to the flak of an arms ban, of a missile test ban, or a warhead test ban, the Soviets acquired that capability with respect to our missiles. They got Merv. They got more accurate. They got larger numbers of warheads and bigger yields and so forth. And, as we are hearing so much today, and will be addressing at the end of the course, the problem of the window of vulnerability arose, supposedly. Our Minutemen are vulnerable to theirs. As a direct consequence of the evolution of this arms race which has been so lobbied for by the Un...by your...our University of California. That cost was foreseen and accepted because it was regarded simply as indispensable that we should have that threat. I'll go into the reasons for that as we go on in the course, but let me just state as a matter now that it's not only Reagan who regarded

that threat of initiating and escalating nuclear war as indispensable if we could support it which we really couldn't do very well in the sixties, late sixties. And so it was not only Reagan who wanted to spend the money on supporting them.

1983 The effect of increasing the insecurity of a heavily armed opponent, as we are doing by such threats, reducing their security, their confidence in their retaliatory or deterrent ability, that's what we are doing by these measures. Reducing their ability to deter us from attacking them. Such measures in a world that we live in do not, in fact, unequivocally increase our own security. To make a heavily armed superpower afraid is not entirely safe. And that is in part as I say because the degree of symmetry of the technology on both sides means that if the arms race continues it really is not possible for us to achieve a functional capability against the Soviets that they will not acquire over time against us. Unless it's been accompanied, of course, by the vulnerabil...direct vulnerability of our own side.

The effective...that reflects a fact that was pointed to in Rand analyses of the late fifties, that even in a world where both sides possessed large numbers of nuclear weapons, there was at least one strong incentive, one circumstance in which it would be "rational" as these analysts described it to launch an attack against the opponent. Not rational. A deliberate choice. And that would be if you believed that the opponent was about to attack you. Wohlstetter and others, except for Kahn, tended to ignore the threats we were actually secretly making of initiating nuclear war in cases where we did not expect the opponent to

attack us. But they did point to the possibility of preemptive attack on either side. And the effect of technology on that possibility—specifically a weapon which on the one hand threatened the opponent's retaliatory forces and on the other hand was vulnerable to attack by those forces (in Wohlstetter's terms in the article I've assigned, "The Delicate Balance of Terror,") could be seen to invite attack, at least in a major crisis. In an intense crisis. To be a kind of lightning rod for attack. To be a target, in other words, and not only a threat.

That is the exact characteristic of the weapons we are developing and putting into Europe today. And not only ourselves. The Pershings with their extreme accuracy, possibly (if it fulfills design characteristics) as close as thirty yards accuracy at over a thousand miles range. Landing in other words, you know, within this...well within this room. A thousand miles away at a target . . . a thousand miles away. And doing so within minutes—precluding warning, precluding a human decision to act on radar warning of the approach of the Pershing, presses the Soviets very strongly to automate. In the first instance to delegate their retaliation to that attack to lower commanders. They virtually have to do that. One can assume that they have done that. As of now. With the very first Pershings that go in—if they haven't done it sooner. The alternative is to accept the certainty that there will be no retaliation to any attack by us since the Pershings have the capability to destroy the Moscow headquarters. Without warning essentially, without adequate warning—enough for humans to act on.

Either they allow lower level commanders to act on indications of either radar or explosions to launch their offensive missiles in



retaliation or they automate that process and in effect delegate it to a computer, or they have no retaliatory capability and we know it. Which is close to inviting attack. One can assume that they have delegated that. The United States did so under similar circumstances and no doubt is doing that now although that is being treated as a great secret. Presumably it is not a secret from the Soviets if these Presidents have continued to delegate that power since the whole point of delegating it would be to deter the Soviets from attacking Washington in hopes they could paralyze our response. It could not be in our interests to keep that a secret from the Soviets and to allow them to believe that they could paralyze us by hitting Washington. Right?

But it is a secret from the American public as you'll find if you call the Pentagon and ask what our policy is on that subject, as I've led a lot of press to do. I encourage them to do it because of my awareness that three Presidents to my direct, official knowledge did delegate that authority although you have always been told the opposite up till this day. Yes?

Q: Since these Pershing missiles come so fast, how do they know who to fly them back at?

Let me get to that. Good question. There's various ways they could automate...um...they could determine their targets to some extent by the nature of the attack taking place. If all you know is that Moscow has been hit, attack this. Otherwise there are other possibilities. That's

a theoretical possibility. Actually in the world of today the command control setup is so vulnerable even without the Pershing that it's hard to believe that one can make all these fine discriminations. Let me get, in fact, to what the target list is and has been. We're really running out of time but I'll do my best in fifteen minutes to cover this.

In 1961, the nuclear war plan that Kennedy inherited from Eisenhower fifteen years, sixteen years into the nuclear era, called for hitting...first of all was a first strike plan on its face. Someone asked me how much I knew of this in early '61 when I was working on these plans and the answer is that I knew the plans but I did not know the truth about the missile gap. I believe there was a missile gap, and believe that what I was up to, what I was working toward sixty or seventy hours a week was averting a Soviet use of their imminent or actual superiority against us. Averting a Soviet nuclear surprise attack on us. So when I looked at war plans I assumed that whatever they said on their face they must be plans for retaliation—what else could they be? What they did say on their face was that they were plans to be used in a wide variety of circumstances. I'll talk more about this later in the third lecture, I think. But specifically the policy under Eisenhower was to use the Strategic Air Command in an allout attack under any circumstances in which the U.S. found itself to be fighting Soviet troops anywhere in the world. It might be used under other circumstances as well. For example, as a...in Quemoy, where we were not facing Russians directly. But if we were facing Russians it would be automatic. It would mean using the Strategic Air Command as well as our tactical nuclear weapons, and using them in an allout attack.

In fact there was single plan for that which culminated in a plan called, then and now, the SIOP, the Single, Integrated Operational Plan. A very...in some ways unusual plan as war plans go because it involves no reserves, no flexibility, it involved basically a trucking operation under any circumstances of war with the Soviet Union, war arising out of anything, fighting in Iran, fighting over Berlin, fighting in Cuba—as appeared possible the very next year. Trucking every weapon we had in our stockpile to East Europe and the Soviet Union and hitting, among other things, every city in the Soviet Union and China since we then believed still in the Sino-Soviet Bloc which was at that...already not a reality but which was a believed reality in our planning for some years after that. Every city in Russia and China.

There are, however, only two hundred and eighteen cities in the Soviet Union over 100,000 population. And there are some 800 over 25,000 population. As Desmond Ball has revealed, we have always targeted all of the cities over 100,000. Always. And have always targeted (since we had enough weapons since the late fifties...early fifties) eighty percent of the remaining 800, so well, the remaining 600 cities. But that's only 800 cities. We have now 10,000 strategic weapons, warheads. So it is true now, as it has been true for many years, that most of our weapons have always been targeted on military targets or various industrial or logistic targets or various things other than cities per se. But it is also true that we have also targeted all the cities. I'm saying that this was planned for circumstances...a wide variety of circumstances as automatic.



I wanted to rewrite those plans, even though I conceived them as retaliatory plans. I did rewrite them. But in the course of that I drafted a question for President Kennedy to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff which I hoped and expected would be an embarrassing question which would increase his bureaucratic leverage over them. The question was, "If you carry out your plans as planned (in other words without Soviet interference with your operations) if you get all the weapons over their targets... How many people will be killed in Russia and China alone?" I said Russia and China alone because I thought that if I asked how many will be killed altogether they would say "Well we haven't computed for everybody." I wanted to bring out what I believed to be the case that they didn't even know how many would die in Russia, that they had never asked that question. That was my impression at the time. That they knew where the tar...where the things would land and what they would do to their missiles and their bombers and what not—their industry. But I thought they had never computed what they would do to the people. I was...and then they would have a choice of either suggesting that the answer was very low, or admitting that they didn't know. And in either case Kennedy could say, "What, you don't even know what your own plans will do? Well, we must look into this. My goodness, this is a very bad situation." It would increase our leverage in getting them to change their plan.

I was mistaken. That was one question of many I drafted which he asked which got answered very quickly. It turned out they had computed it and they sent over computer readouts within a week. To the Secretary

of Defen...actually the White House, Secretary of Defense, showing how many would die in the first month, second month and so forth, for about six months in terms of fallout.

The answer was 325 million people. And since they knew that I then had to ask how many in...elsewhere, and they knew...they knew that too. Another 100 million for East Europe. And that gets you up to about 425 million. However, the fallout from our thermonuclear warheads on Russia alone would wipe out all the countries outside the Warsaw Pact that bordered that area. Finland would be annihilated by fallout from attacks on Leningrad. Austria would be annihilated because the winds blew that way, assuming they did as they usually do. Japan, Pakistan, Afghanistan. All totally destroyed by our own attacks on Russia without their being directly parties to the war. Without allowing really for much retaliation against the U.S. but allowing for some retaliation against the...East Europe...ah, West Europe, the total bill could not be less than 600 million people if we initiated those war plans.

A very resonant figure. A hundred holocausts, a hundred times six million. These were plans that had been designed by American friends of mine. Military. As I say, I was almost one of the very few civilians who knew anything of this although there were a few. People though that I respected. Intelligent, funny guys that I had lunch with. And we're involved in planning—to be sure, as I supposed, for retaliation, though on the face of it, first strike—to kill half a billion people. How that came to be is a question I have been circling around for the last twenty years.

Who were these guys? Did I really know them? How did Americans come to make plans like this? How could they have gotten to this position? And it became, of course, an obsession of mine to change that state of affairs. I was diverted from that for some years by the Viet Nam War where the bombs were actually falling, but I went back to it as soon as they stopped falling in Viet Nam. By which time of course I'd understood that the Joint Chiefs had known something that I hadn't known at that time. And that was that there was no missile gap. They were first strike plans and that was another aspect of this.

Now at that time, and since, people who have felt that we needed the threat of first use, the threat of first strike, like Herman Kahn, like Edward Teller, and like many military, have put very great emphasis on the fact that I just quoted to you, that if worst came to worst, these plans would only kill half a billion to a billion people. There was some reality, in fact good reality to that. The point that Jonathan Shell focused on—the possibility of destroying all life on earth, which was...has always been widely feared by the public—was never the likely result in terms of available scientific knowledge at that time—of carrying this out. As Shell knew and said, though a lot of people didn't appreciate that in his book. He was looking at a possibility. It's a possibility that has been very vociferously denied by Teller and by Kahn and by others all these years. And I've often been puzzled also by the degree of emphasis they put on that fact. That it was only a billion—it wasn't everybody.

I had various theories up until quite recently which I now see were a little off...off probably as to why they felt it so significant. I was



quite prepared to tell audiences up until this month that Teller is probably right on this point. Not everybody will die. We put that to one side. What we are talking about is the death of a billion people. Or as the National Academy of Sciences indicated, perhaps two billion people. Still half or so, less the pop... That's what I'm talking about. And I'm also talking about the fact that may come about not only by an accident, or an unauthorized action, or a mistaken false alarm, or the action of a mad third party, a Kadafi, a Khoumani, whoever, who has triggered this thing. Although all those are possible and the possibility is growing. It may also come from the deliberate decision of an American President to carry out plans that he has previously approved for these circumstances. For which he and his predecessors have bought the weapons. For which Americans have trained and planned and prepared for a generation. That's how it may happen, and in fact that's incomparably most likely way it can happen. And that's...that's true, I believe. We'll see what you think of that by the end of the course. I thought that was bad enough. Let's talk about that.

I've come to realize a new way why (just this month) why Teller and Herman and others were emphasizing the contrary so much. Look at Herman's statement here on page...I mean you'll...you'll see it in the reading, on page 22. His study which takes the first part of his book of civil defense con...quote in italics in his book "We concluded that for at least the next decade or so any picture of total world annihilation appears to be wrong irrespective of the military course of events." No matter how you use the weapons. That's the way Teller often puts it, no

matter how you use the weapons there is no possibility of killing everybody.

Teller's disciple and deputy, a very high guy at Livermore named Lowell Wood whose the man behind the space wars (star wars program that's going on now) once was on a program with me and said to someone else on the panel, "It is absolutely impossible that we could kill everybody on earth no matter how we used the weapons. That's out of the question." At that point I intervened, I said, "Do we have your personal assurance of that?" And he said, "You, Sir, have my guarantee of that." Which was an interesting...that's the kind of bet you don't have to pay if you're wrong, you know. So it's kind of a safe assurance for him to give. But as I say I was puzzled as to why that seemed so significant for him to say. I now, I now do understand it.

If it were true that our own attack would kill everybody, or at least that the retaliation would do so we would die. It would be a suicidal threat. And although suicidal threats can be effective and are made and have been used, it is considerably less credible to make those threats. And above all, less acceptable to a public that is asked to support them. If you cannot assure them, in his terms here, if worst comes to worst and we have to carry out these threats at their utmost, we won't die. If you can't say that you have trouble mobilizing public support for the policy.

Well, Herman is wrong. Teller has been wrong. The Sagan article which came out this month in Foreign Affairs and which is a, in popular terms, a paraphrase of two articles to be found in the current issue of

Science magazine (triple A S) summarizes a study completed just this year of an analysis which had its genesis no more than a couple of years ago. New data. It puts into the calculations a factor that no one had ever calculated before. No one in the government to this day, and outsiders till now. Soot from burning cities. People had calculated in the National Academy of Science study that I was referred to just a few years ago, the effect of the dust raised by the explosions—the ground burst explosions, and the effect this would have on the light reaching the earth and the resulting winds and climate. And had concluded that the effect would be short lived and not enormously prominent in the long term effects—would not affect the long term effects very much. That's because the dust falls out very quickly.

No one had calculated the effects of the soot from burning cities which are particles fine enough to stay in the air for quite a while. They create clouds so dense over the entire world ultimately as to shut out most of the sunlight for the world. For a prolonged period. Possibly months. To some respects for as long as a year. The details are in the Sagan article and it's necessary for you to read that early in the course in my opinion to have a sense of what the course is about, and what the urgency of the human situation is.

Herman had described as a hypothetical, conceptual notion what he called a Doomsday Machine. A device that would be...crea...that would end all life on earth if triggered by, as he put it, a few opponents' nuclear weapons. It would go off automatically and somehow he even said, perhaps by major climatic changes...um...would...um...end all life on



earth. And he said that would be the perfect deterrent. But he said it would not be acceptable for a variety of reasons to the military. I'm quoting, you'll see in here he says, "I'm reassured by how readily the military realize that this is an unacceptable form of Type I deterrence. It kills too many people, and so forth." He doesn't seem to have observed that it puts them out of work right now. No function for the Air Force if you have a Doomsday Machine. But anyway he was reassured by that. He said he was less reassured by the fact of how many civilians and engineers and physicists seemed to think it was a good idea. But he thought that despite that it was not available then, could be available in a few years, but would never be bought by either superpower. We had a Doomsday Machine as he wrote that.

Our current war plan in 1959 by targeting every city in Russia and China, would have killed us and everybody else. By mistake. That was not the intent of the plan. He talked about a mutual homicide machine, which is what he thought we had then. But we didn't. They didn't have the ability to kill us. That was an ability just for the two superpowers to kill each other. We had what we thought was a unilateral homicide machine. One could worry about it morally killing 600 million people but we would have gotten off. But that was not what we had. We had bought a Doomsday Machine. Because we targeted the cities.

It's time to close and I hate to close on what is bad news. But the bad news is really this. I conclude from the information... Wait one minute and let me pass this on. I conclude from the information that you'll be getting in this course a very unhappy answer to the following

question. Now that it is knowable that what we have is a Domsday Machine—an automatic destroyer of life on earth (or something close to that) a reduction to prehistoric levels of human population at best—around the globe in the southern hemisphere as well as the north— Now that we know that that is what we have, will we dismantle it?

By we I mean can we leave it to the President and Bhreshnev and to the others to take it apart? Sagan seems to think that is the clear technical question that lies ahead. You know, the problem. Once he's pointed out to them that this is what they have they will presumably want to unhook it. Now how do we do that?

I'm afraid that's not the right answer. I do not think it is automatic—or I have to say likely—that the leaders of this world who have bought these weapons, Democrat or Republican, Andropov or his successor, will, in fact, move voluntarily to take that machine apart. Now that they discover what they have. If that's paradoxical or implausible to you, so much the better. Then that's...the course will bear on the question, and you may or may not agree with me in the end, but I think you'll see what I am talking about. That doesn't mean to me that the machine is doomed to go off. I draw a good deal of hope from one fact—that the Presidents have kept the motives that led them to build what they thought was only a mass murder machine—and Bhreshnev and Andropov as well—were not motives they cared to share with their publics. The reason you didn't know these kinds of things I've been talking about now are most of what's in the course. And most of what you'll read in the course was top secret a little bit earlier. (I'll go

into that later.) For a reason. To keep the public from being aware of that. Because presidents and their counterparts in the Soviet Union and France and England and Israel did not count on the public to ratify or support what they were doing—what they were doing in their own good conscience and their own sincerity—if the public knew what they were doing. I think, I believe, that they were right about that. And in this country in particular, we have the ability to act on information which we have, that's why I'm putting it out. And I'm very glad you're here, so let's get on with it. Thank you.